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ROGER BACON, LOGICIAN AND MATHEMATI-
CIAN.
BY PHILIP E. B. J onRDM N.
ALTHOUGH Bacon was preeminently a physicist he was never
i tired of praising mathematics. Theologians, he said, ought
"to abound in the power of numbering."^ Then again, "divine
mathematics alone can purge the intellect and fit the student for the
acquirement of all knowledge." He showed himself much more
wide-minded than his more famous namesake, Francis Bacon: for
not only did he state as a fundamental principle that the study of
natural science must rest on experiment, but he also explained how
astronomy and the physical sciences rest ultimately on mathematics,
and progress only when their fundamental principles are expressed
in a mathematical form. Mathematics, he said, should be regarded
as the alphabet of all philosophy.
Roger Bacon strove unsuccessfully to replace logic in the cur-
riculum of the University of Oxford by mathematical and lin-
guistic studies. In fact, he had a low opinion of the utility of logic,
because reasoning seemed to him to be innate. We can form some
idea of how far Bacon was in this case in advance of his times,
when we reflect that even at the present day Oxford University
still cultivates the Aristotelian logic with its errors and limitations,
and its learned professors regard modern and more profound
logical work with contempt, for no other apparent reason than that
it is a product of the last sixty years. The fact is that Roger
Bacon and all the really scientific objectors to scholastic logic, in-
cluding Kant, were quite right: the Aristotelian or merely syllogistic
logic of classes and propositions is quite insufiicient for the pur-
poses of even elementary arithmetic and geometry. For any scien-
^This and the following quotations are taken from W. W. Rouse Ball,
A Short Account of the History of Mathematics, 4th ed., New York and
London, 1908, pp. 169, 175, 176.
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tific purpose, we must leave scholastic logic in the school. In the
present problems of science we can no more effect anything with
it than a regiment armed with bows and arrows could take Gib-
raltar. Logic has now recognized that it must, if it is to be of any
real use in the world, make use of a symbolism more or less anal-
ogous to the ingeniously thought-out and economical (in Mach's
sense) symbolism of algebra. Modern logicians see that using
algebraical signs like "a + &" does not necessarily imply that "a"
and "&" stand for numbers, any more than French people, when
they speak of a "chou", mean a shoe,
II.
Let us now turn to Bacon's mathematical work. The most im-
portant part is his work on "perspective."'- But we will here fix
our attention on his discussion of "continuity." Nowadays it is the
usual opinion among those who have studied the subject that it
was Zeno the Eleatic who first incontrovertibly showed the unten-
ability of the Pythagorean doctrine that lines, surfaces, and solids
are composed of points. I refer more especially to the third and
fourth of Zeno's famous arguments about motion, preserved
—
though probably in a mangled state—by Aristotle. Zeno's first
two arguments about motion, which are far better known and are
—unlike the others—readily refutable at the present day, may con-
ceivably be directed against the opposite view that spaces are divi-
sible to infinity. Aristotle was a supporter of the doctrine of in-
finite divisibility and an opponent of Zeno, and devoted much space
in his Physics to the discussion of "continuity," which he expressed
by the Greek word crwex^?.
Now, in the thirty-ninth chapter of his Opus tcrtinm,^ Bacon
discussed continuous spatial magnitudes, and emphasized the im-
possibility of generating such magnitudes from single point-ele-
ments. His proof of this was as follows. If a square were formed
of points—for example, suppose that a side contained 5 points and
a whole square was formed out of five columns or five rows of
five points each—then the diagonal would also be formed of five
points. The diagonal, then, would be equal to a side, and this is
geometrically impossible. Kurd Lasswitz* showed that this proof
of Bacon's occurred previously with the Arabian mathematician
^ Cf. Moritz Cantor, Vorlcsungen i'lber Geschichte der Mathcmatik, Vol. II,
pp. 97-99. 2d ed., Leipsic, 1900.
^ Opera quaedam hactenus inedita (ed. J. S. Brewer), Vol. I, 1859, p. 132.
Cf. M. Cantor, op. cit., p. 97.
* Geschichte der Atomistik vom Mittelalter bis Neivton. Hamburg and
Leipsic, Vol. I, pp. 194, 149.
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Mutakallimun. It may be remarked that Bacon, especially in his
work on "perspective," made great use of the writings of Arabian
authors.
The Greek language was known, as Bacon himself indicated,
by many of the learned of the thirteenth century, but there was for
the most part a lack of Greek works.^ It can hardly be doubted
that Bacon was not familiar with the fourth and last of Zeno's
arguments about motion, which was against the composition of
space out of indivisibles, especially as Aristotle in his Physics had
in all probability mangled this argument out of all similarity to its
original form. And indeed, outwardly, Zeno's argument is very
different from that of Bacon. But both have this in common: They
can only be satisfactorily answered by one who knows that the
modern theory of infinity and continuity has resolved all the con-
tradictions that were formerly thought to subsist in these notions.
In Bacon's case, we now know that the diagonal of a square may,
in Georg Cantor's terminology, contain the same cardinal number
of points as the side, although they are of different lengths. It is
not, then, impossible to hold that a continuous line is composed of
points. Both Zeno and Bacon seem to have proved that we cannot
do this if the points are finite in number.
Finally, it may be remarked that Aristotle's conception seems
to have made its first explicit appearance in the West in a definition'
of Thomas Bradwardine, who was probably born a few years before
Roger Bacon died.
' Cantor, op, cit., p. 99.
^ Ibid.,
-p. \\9.
